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Abstract—In Ireland, judges can only be removed as a result of ‘stated 
misbehaviour’ but the extent of this phrase is unclear, as is the process of 
actually removing the judge. Furthermore, Ireland has no formal process 
for lesser forms of judicial discipline. These oversights have exacerbated 
controversies of judicial behaviour. For example, during the Sheedy 
Affair, there was no formal mechanism for investigating or issuing 
sanctions as a result of the conduct of the judges and in the Curtin case, 
the difficulties involved in the attempt to remove the judge delayed the 
process to such an extent that the judge eventually retired on a full 
pension. A more recent episode involving an ‘improper approach’ by a 
judge into the case of another judge highlighted the lack of any proper 
procedures in this area. Given that this is an issue that impacts both 
judicial independence and public confidence in the judiciary to a 
significant degree, it is vital that a formal system for disciplining and 
removing judges is established in Ireland. In this context, this article 
examines the current system and analyses potential reforms to this. 
 
Introduction 
In a survey carried out last year by the European Commission, The Irish legal 
system was ranked the second highest in Europe for its perceived level of judicial 
independence. However, in recent years various issues have arisen which have 
caused us to question our levels of protection for judicial independence and how this 
can be balanced with accountability. Such discussions arose during the debates on 
the judicial pay referendum, the controversy caused by Judge Kelly’s comments in 
2013 that the government was demolishing judicial independence,
1
 and the more 
recent debates about the appropriateness of the current judicial appointments 
procedure. Of course, these questions arise most frequently around instances of 
judicial misconduct. The Judicial Council Bill was to have provided an appropriate 
mechanism for balancing judicial independence and accountability but it has never 
even reached the stage of being debated in the Oireachtas. 
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The Bill is included on the government’s current programme for legislation. 
While this is a positive move, given that it is listed as number 37 on the Justice list 
and it has been on the books for a long time at this stage, holding one’s breath in 
anticipation of its publication any time soon would not be advisable. However, the 
issues which led to the idea of such a bill in the first place have not gone away – we 
simply have not spoken about them in a while so perhaps we need to revive the 
discussion on this in advance of its potential publication.  
One issue which has not yet really been discussed is whether our system of 
disciplining and removing judges is fit for purpose. One might argue that Ireland’s 
judges have an excellent reputation and we do not need a formal disciplinary system. 
However, there have been controversies in recent years and we have to consider if 
the outcomes of these episodes have been satisfactory. Take, for example, the 
Sheedy Affair, where two judges and a county registrar resigned following the 
release of Philip Sheedy from prison.
2
 This episode had serious consequences for the 
administration of justice in Ireland and we have to question whether the result was 
fair both for the judges involved but also in relation to public confidence in the 
system. The other obvious example here is the case of Judge Brian Curtin, who 
could not be prosecuted for the possession of child pornography due to an expired 
warrant but whose removal proved a messy and ultimately unsuccessful venture and 
the judge later resigned on a full pension.
3
 A less obvious example is the episode 
which came to light in 2013 when Judge Abbott alleged that Judge Desmond Hogan 
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found guilty of causing death by dangerous driving and was sentenced to four years in prison by 
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had made an improper approach about a current case.
4
 Following a brief joint 
investigation by President of the High Court, Mr Justice Nicholas Kearns and 
President of the Circuit Court Ray Groarke, it was decided that no wrongdoing had 
occurred but many questions were left unanswered. On the basis of these examples, 
it is difficult to argue that we do not need a proper judicial disciplinary system which 
would clarify issues around removal and sanctioning of judges. In advance of the 
possible publication of the Judicial Council Bill and before we decide on appropriate 
reform, we have to first examine the system which currently exists in Ireland and 
then consider possible improvements to this.  
While it is not possible to cover every angle of the discussion in this Article, 
the current system, including the meaning of ‘stated misbehaviour’, will first be 
examined. It is submitted that this phrase is too vague and potential mechanisms for 
clarifying this will be considered. Then the possibility of disciplinary action and 
sanctions as well as the adoption of a code of conduct will be considered as to 
whether these are a possible way to improve judicial discipline while upholding 
independence. Finally, the various reform proposals and attempts at providing 
reform will be analysed. 
 
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM FOR REMOVAL OF A JUDGE IN IRELAND 
The only disciplinary procedure to which all judges can be held accountable is 
Article 35.4.1º of Bunreacht na hÉireann.
5
 This provision states: ‘A judge of the 
Supreme Court or the High Court shall not be removed from office except for stated 
misbehaviour or incapacity, and then only upon resolutions passed by Dáil Éireann 
and Seanad Éireann calling for his removal.’ It is essential that the meaning of this 
phrase be determined as judges in Ireland can only be formally disciplined under this 
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provision.
6
 Furthermore, the only form of discipline currently available is the 
nuclear option of removing a judge from office. At present, due to the elusiveness of 
this provision, it is not necessarily clear whether any particular act will constitute 
misbehaviour which necessitates removal. Surprisingly enough, we have not yet had, 
either here or in the United Kingdom, a situation in which there was an attempt to 
remove a judge who disputed the argument that her conduct amounted to 
misbehaviour as would warrant removal, although it is likely that this argument 
would have been put forward on behalf of Mr Justice O’Flaherty, following the 
Sheedy Affair, had he not resigned.
7
 In the Curtin case, for example, although he 
denied accessing child pornography, Judge Curtin did admit to accessing adult 
pornography and it seems to have been accepted that this did not amount to stated 
misbehaviour. Equally, it was accepted without discussion that accessing child 
pornography would constitute misbehaviour. There has never been any real attempt 
to question what, in fact, would come under the provision. This will now be 
considered below. 
 
II. THE MEANING OF STATED MISBEHAVIOUR 
 
This phrase ‘stated misbehaviour’ was first adopted in Article 68 of the 1922 
Constitution of Saorstát Éireann. This is the only part of the Article which appears to 
depart from the 1701 provision which had previously applied.
8
 In the past, the 
phrase ‘during good behaviour’ had always been used. The Irish phrase used in 
Article 35.4.1º is mí-iompair, which simply means bad behaviour. Generally, 
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 There are specific provisions available for disciplining judges of the District Court; see s 21 of the 
Courts of Justice (District Court) Act 1946, ss 10(4) and 36 (2) of the Courts (Supplemental 
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7
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‘stated’ means detailed or expressed, and we can presume the intention was that the 
misbehaviour in question must be detailed and not just a vague accusation before an 
address is taken.
9
 This seems to have been the interpretation taken in the Curtin 
case.
10
 In other words, this nuclear option would not be taken on the basis of blind 
allegations. The aim is to prevent frivolous, unverified allegations of misconduct 
against judges and ensure fairness in that there would have to be proof before the 
ultimate step of removing the judge is taken. So, the real question is: What 
constitutes misbehaviour?  
 
(i) Defining Misbehaviour 
 
At first glance, it would seem that a definition of misbehaviour would not pose any 
problems but further consideration reveals the difficulties. In any attempt to define 
misbehaviour, the most obvious example would be serious crime; it would be safe to 
say that all types of serious crime such as murder, attempted murder, rape etc would 
be considered misbehaviour for the purposes of Article 35.4.1º. However, it is 
questionable whether all criminal acts should be taken into account. Take, for 
example, a judge receiving a conviction for a minor traffic offence as opposed to a 
series of drunken driving offences.
11
 Driving in a bus lane or receiving a parking 
ticket could hardly be equated with getting behind the wheel of a car while 
intoxicated.  
It seems the current position taken in Ireland is that the offence would have 
to be sufficiently serious, as illustrated by the Terence Finn case. On 18 January 
2008, a District Court Judge from Mitchelstown, Judge Terence Finn, was charged 
with ‘failing to display an NCT cert, using a vehicle without an NCT cert and with 
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 The equivalent provision in the Australian constitution uses the words ‘proved misbehaviour’. It is 
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 edn, Bloomsbury 2003) para 
[6.4.38] fn 70.  
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failure to produce an NCT cert’.12 However, it was never suggested that disciplinary 
action should be taken. Evidently, these sorts of offences are not considered so 
serious as to constitute actual misbehaviour. However, if the judge in question is one 
who would normally hear cases concerning minor traffic offences, one would 
imagine the conviction could be considered serious in the eyes of the public. How 
could a judge pass judgment on others if it was common knowledge that s/he had 
actually committed the same offence?
13
 While certainly not serious enough to merit 
removal, this case provokes questions on whether or not lesser disciplinary sanctions 
would be appropriate in such cases. 
In 1976, Professor Shetreet, a leading authority on the subject of judicial 
discipline, defined misbehaviour as involving the following types of misconduct: 
misconduct involving moral turpitude (corruption or corrupt motives); unjustified 
absence from office or neglect of official duties; persistent political partisanship or 
partiality; misconduct in private life; criminal behaviour.
14
 In fact, misconduct 
involving ‘moral turpitude’ seems to have been a prerequisite in the past for any 
motion of inquiry into the conduct of a judge in England and Wales.
15
 In 1994, a 
letter from the Lord Chancellor to the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales 
mentioned drink driving, offences of violence, dishonesty or ‘moral turpitude’ as 
instances of misbehaviour. Behaviour which ‘could cause offence, particularly on 
racial or religious grounds, or amounting to sexual harassment’ was also 
mentioned.
16
 Many of these examples also cause difficulty, however. While neglect 
of official duties and political partisanship are unproblematic, examples such as 
‘misconduct in private life’ are questionable. Furthermore, even the example of 
behaviour involving ‘moral turpitude’ would be difficult to define and apply in 
different circumstances. 
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 RTÉ News, 18 January 2008: <http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0118/finnt.html?rss> Accessed 24 July 
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There has been some attempt at a definition of misbehaviour in Australia. 
Article 72 of the Australian Constitution provides the following:  
The Justices of the High Court and of the other courts created by the 
Parliament… [s]hall not be removed except by the Governor-General in 
Council, on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same 
session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour 
or incapacity.
17
 
Older Australian authorities had given a very limited interpretation of this provision. 
In 1984, the DPP Ian Temby opined ‘ordinarily such misbehaviour must be in a 
matter pertaining to the office held although conviction for an infamous offence 
which renders the person unfit to exercise the office is apparently sufficient…’18 The 
Solicitor General of the Commonwealth, Dr Griffith, was formally requested to give 
an opinion as to the meaning of the expression. His conclusions were that the phrase 
was limited to ‘matters pertaining to: (a) judicial office, including non-attendance, 
neglect of or refusal to perform duties; and (b) the commission of an offence against 
the general law of such a quality that the incumbent is unfit to exercise office’.19 
Since then, a number of opinions have been given,
20
 all of which suggest that s 72 
has no such restricted meaning but that it extends to any behaviour indicating 
unfitness for judicial office.
21
 This seems like a sensible approach and the examples 
above given by Shetreet and the Lord Chancellor could all come within a definition 
of behaviour indicating unfitness for judicial office.  
In New Zealand in 1997, the Solicitor-General gave an opinion on the 
definition of ‘misbehaviour’ during the case of Judge Beattie, who had been charged 
but acquitted of intent to defraud.
22
 It was the Solicitor-General’s opinion that 
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‘misbehaviour’ means ‘conduct that is [so] morally wrong and improper that it 
demonstrates a judge lacks the integrity to continue to exercise judicial office’.23 
However, he rejected a test based on public confidence in the administration of 
justice.  
The most recent consideration of the meaning of misbehaviour is the Privy 
Council’s Hearing on the Report of the Chief Justice of Gibraltar.24 In considering 
the meaning of ‘misbehaviour’25 the majority of the Privy Council approved of the 
approach of Lord Scott in the case of Lawrence v Attorney General of Grenada.
26
 
Lord Scott identified four ‘ingredients’, which the Privy Council felt could be best 
employed by asking the following questions: 
1. Has the Chief Justice’s conduct affected directly his ability to carry out the 
duties and discharge the functions of his office? 
2. Has that conduct adversely affected the perception of others as to his ability 
to carry out those duties and discharge those functions? 
3. Would it be perceived to be inimical to the due administration of justice in 
Gibraltar if the Chief Justice remains in office? 
4. Has the office of Chief Justice been brought into disrepute by the Chief 
Justice’s conduct?27 
As Shetreet and Turenne have noted, the first three factors assume a link between 
the misbehaviour and a reason why the judge would be less effective to continue his 
duties on account of it and these overlap to a certain extent but the final requirement 
that the office be brought into disrepute adds an element of gravity. Despite the 
apparent clarity in the test above, agreement on four questions proved difficult for 
the Privy Council and ultimately led to a disagreement on whether the conduct of the 
Chief Justice satisfied the final test.
28
 While the majority recommended the removal 
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 [2009] UKPC 43. This followed a domestic tribunal hearing which recommended the removal of 
the Chief Justice.  
25
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of the judge, the minority felt that the high threshold for removal had not been 
satisfied. However, all were in agreement that public confidence had been adversely 
affected by the conduct of the judge. 
 
 
(ii) Finding a Yardstick 
We have not yet had a discussion in Ireland as to how to define ‘misbehaviour’ for 
the purposes of Article 35.4.1º.
29
 In deciding on a definition it is necessary to 
consider whether it would be useful to have specific categories, such as those 
originally favoured by Shetreet,
30
 expressly set out in statute, as grounds for 
removal. There is an argument in favour of laying out the grounds for removal in 
statute so as to give guidance as to whether something constitutes misbehaviour or 
not. The Consultative Council of European Judges has insisted on the need for a 
‘precise definition of offences for which a judge may be removed from office and 
for disciplinary procedures complying with the due process requirements of the 
Convention on Human Rights’.31 However, as well as the obvious problem as to 
how such a statute would be drafted, this suggestion also brings up the more general 
argument of detailed provisions versus general principles. The modern trend is in 
favour of having detailed provisions to deal with every part of the law. This can be 
seen in many recent Acts of the Oireachtas.
32
 Many parts of the common law and 
older customs are regulated according to general principles which, some would 
argue, are insufficient in today’s world. It is argued that including more detail in 
such provisions excludes the possibility of confusion and possible injustice. On the 
other hand, there is an argument supporting the general principles because of the fact 
that they can cover more ground without having to be specific and so nothing is 
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 See, for example, recent Company Law legislation where there is an attempt to legislate for all 
possible scenarios, which in turn makes for very detailed and complex legislation. 
 10 
inadvertently left out. However, creating statutory categories would mean compiling 
a list of all of the possible types of behaviour which would warrant removal, 
something which could hardly be exhaustive. In particular, having a specific list for 
misconduct in office could potentially exclude things which might not occur to 
legislators now but which might, with the changing of society, become problematic 
later on.  
Because of these difficulties it is suggested instead that a yardstick be used to 
clarify the meaning of Article 35.4.1º. This then leaves the question as to what 
would be the most appropriate yardstick. Based on the discussion above, one clear 
candidate, which is arguably the most essential feature in the system of justice, is 
public confidence. There needs to be public confidence in the administration of 
justice in order for the system to work. As Lord Denning once noted: 
 
a judge who was guilty of conduct which lead people to point a finger of 
scorn saying, ‛who made thee a ruler and a judge over us’, should not be 
tolerated on the bench. Such scornful remarks destroy the confidence 
which people should have in judges.
33
 
 
The courts system could not function if members of the public, as well as lawyers, 
had to appear before judges in whom they had no confidence or respect and this 
seems to be the unwritten test in many instances of misconduct. The importance of 
this factor is well illustrated by a quote from former United States Senator Sam J 
Ervin: ‘Judges who lose the general respect of the public, for whatever the reason, 
weaken the entire structure of the judiciary, and consequently damage an important 
factor contributing to social stability and peace.’34 
The only difficulty is how to tell if the matter has actually affected public 
confidence and to what extent. Do you ask the first person you see on the street? Or 
would you consult a lawyer or a politician? Or should your quest be directed toward 
finding the rational man or the right-thinking woman? One might suggest judging 
the matter by the reaction in the press, letters to the editor, or by the amount of 
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 Shetreet quoting Lord Denning. See Shetreet (n 14) 282.  
34
 Shetreet (n 14) quoting from P B Kurland Appointment and Disappointment of Supreme Court 
Justices 1972 Law & Soc Order 183, 235. 
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people complaining on radio or social media. But even if you deduce that a lot of 
people are annoyed about the situation, how can you tell if public confidence has 
been damaged to such an extent that in order to rectify it the judge must be removed 
or disciplined? Essentially, there is no easy answer to this question and the most 
obvious answer is that each case would have to be considered on its own merits. 
Despite this difficulty, it is submitted that such a yardstick would at least eliminate 
much of the current ambiguity surrounding the meaning of ‘misbehaviour’. 
While the question has not yet been seriously considered in Ireland, there 
have been some suggestions put forward in various reform proposals on how to 
clarify the phrase. 
 
 
(iii) Proposals 
The Constitution Review Group, which reported in 1996,
35
 recommended, among 
other things, the insertion of the words ‘prejudicial to the office of judge’36 into 
Article 35.4.1º in order to qualify the meaning of stated misbehaviour. The group 
was of the opinion that the phrase ‘stated misbehaviour’ could give rise to 
difficulties and so it would be necessary to provide a more precise meaning: ‘It 
considers that to use the phrase “prejudicial to the office of judge” to qualify “stated 
misbehaviour” would more clearly identify the elements of what should give rise to 
impeachment.’37 
 This proposal was rejected, however, by the All-Party Oireachtas Committee 
on the Constitution in their Fourth Progress Report in 1999.
38
 It is unclear why it 
was rejected, since no alternative had been proposed and the direction is not 
sufficient as it is. The reasoning given in the progress report of the Committee was 
that it was ‘unnecessary to narrow the grounds for removal in this manner. The 
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38
 Fourth Progress Report: The Courts and the Judiciary, The All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution, Dublin Stationery Office, 1999. 
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terms are used throughout the common law world.’39 However, an amendment as 
proposed by the Constitution Review Group would not amount to a narrowing of the 
Article but rather would provide a yardstick which would allow for a consideration 
of many types of behaviour. It is difficult to see how such an addition could narrow 
the grounds for removal. On the contrary, the clarification ‘prejudicial to the office 
of judge’ is still quite vague and open to interpretation, as demonstrated by the 
Gibraltar Hearing. The Report of the Oireachtas Committee went on to note the 
types of conduct believed by Professor Shetreet to come within the meaning of 
misbehaviour, as outlined above. Each of these types of misconduct could also be 
considered ‘prejudicial to the office of judge’, so the reason for rejecting the 
proposal of the Constitution Review Group does not stand up. Even if we were to 
take these five categories as examples, however, the problem remains of what types 
of criminal behaviour should be considered and what constitutes misconduct in 
private life. Professor Shetreet does propose a workable test based on public 
confidence, and the report recognises this: 
 
In Professor Shetreet’s view, the test as to whether events reach a 
standard justifying removal is whether the behaviour has consequences 
for public confidence in the administration of justice. This permits the 
conduct to be considered in the social context in which it occurs.
40
 
 
After making this valid point, the Committee goes on to state: ‘Retaining the 
existing grounds will allow the Oireachtas to refer to precedents in other common 
law countries.’41 This is a disappointing conclusion on this point. It is unfortunate 
that the Committee did not recommend a change along the lines of the suggestions 
of the Constitution Review Group or Professor Shetreet. In any case, inserting a 
clarification to the wording of Article 34.5.1º would not preclude the use of 
precedents in other jurisdictions as persuasive authority. 
The UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide a 
similar direction to that suggested by the Review Group: ‘Judges shall be subject to 
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40
 ibid 31. 
41
 ibid. 
 13 
suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that renders them 
unfit to discharge their duties’.42 In many cases in the United States it has been 
assumed that misbehaviour extends to any conduct indicating unfitness for office. A 
yardstick in the style of one of these would certainly be a suitable possibility for 
determining what type of behaviour should be considered. When an act of 
misconduct is called into question we need to decide whether it is so serious that the 
judge involved could not possibly continue to administer justice. At present, the 
direction in the Constitution is not clear enough to make that decision 
straightforward. While a yardstick based on public confidence or fitness for judicial 
office might still be difficult to measure, it at least would provide a more stable basis 
than that which currently exists. 
 
III. BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
In any discussion of judicial discipline and removal, it is important to bear in mind 
the principle of judicial independence. This is a fundamental principle in our 
Constitution but it is potentially vulnerable to attack in the areas of judicial 
appointment, remuneration and removal. Therefore it is important that in reforming 
these areas that judicial independence is preserved. 
 In the past, judicial independence generally meant independence from the 
executive; this is due to the power the executive traditionally held over the 
judiciary.
43
 Today, judicial independence has a much broader meaning. Chief Justice 
Denham has described it as follows: ‘The concept of the independence of the judge 
exists so that he or she may fulfil his or her duties freely. The concept exists to guard 
the impartiality of the judge, to protect the judge from interference… Both the 
institutional judiciary and the individual judiciary are independent.’44 She continues 
to make a significant point: ‘The independence of the judiciary is for the benefit of 
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 Number 18, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985), as quoted in the 
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Separation of Powers in the Irish Constitution (Roundhall 1997) 10. 
44
 Susan Denham, ‘The Diamond in a Democracy: An Independent, Accountable Judiciary’ (2001) 5 
The Judicial Review 31, 58. 
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the community, not the judges. It is a duty not a privilege for a judge.’45 Therefore, 
judicial independence is linked to public confidence in the administration of justice – 
in order to have confidence in the system, the public needs to be assured both that 
judges will be independent but also that they will be accountable.  
Thus, the best way to ensure independence and accountability is to provide 
for a carefully thought-through system of removal and discipline of judges, which 
would abide by fair procedures. The 1999 report of the All-Party Oireachtas 
Committee on the Constitution determined that by maintaining the distinction 
between judicial decisions (which should not generally be investigated as part of 
disciplinary measures) and judicial conduct, ‘one can maintain a balance between 
judicial independence and accountability’.46 Martin Friedland has also considered 
this issue in Canada and concluded that: 
 
There is a natural tension between accountability and independence. The 
public needs to be assured that complaints of misconduct are properly 
dealt with. At the same time, accountability could have an inhibiting 
effect on proper judicial action. It is necessary to devise systems that 
provide for accountability, yet at the same time do not curtail a judge’s 
obligation to rule honestly and according to the law. A well-thought-out, 
balanced system should enhance accountability and, at the same time, 
increase the public’s confidence in the judiciary and therefore encourage 
respect for judicial independence.
47
 
 
Given that judicial independence and public confidence are linked, it would 
seem that the lack of a transparent system of judicial discipline and removal in 
Ireland is a greater threat to independence than a properly thought-out, balanced 
system of accountability.
48
 
Another issue related to independence is the question of who should 
ultimately decide whether something constitutes stated misbehaviour, with or 
without the addition of a yardstick-type clarification. This is a complicated matter 
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which raises deep separation of powers questions. However, during the course of 
interviews conducted with members of the judiciary, the overwhelming consensus 
among the judges was that this is an issue for the legislature. This is not a question to 
which deep consideration has been given in any of the reform reports but it is 
generally assumed that the Oireachtas would make this determination. This also 
seems to be the position following the judgment in the Curtin case, where Murray CJ 
found that Curtin would be entitled to a distinct hearing on the issue of 
misbehaviour, which should be adjudicated on before the Houses considered the 
second question of whether or not the judge should be removed.
49
 On the question of 
whether or not the courts could review a decision on what constitutes stated 
misbehaviour, it may well be that we will have to await a decision from the courts 
on this specific issue before we can have a definite answer. 
A final point on judicial independence is that since it is linked with public 
confidence, then it would be sensible to consider the creation of a judicial 
disciplinary system for dealing with conduct short of removal in order to maintain 
confidence in the system and ensure accountability. 
 
IV. DISCIPLINE AND SANCTIONS 
 
Another factor that has yet to be considered in Ireland is the issue of sanctions as a 
lesser form of discipline and the question of whether a judge could continue in office 
if she were to be admonished or sanctioned (but not actually threatened with 
removal). In Ireland, apart from the limited system for disciplining District Court 
judges,
50
 there is no lesser form of sanction besides the nuclear option of removal. 
While it might be argued that it is not possible to provide a system of sanctions at all 
as any black mark against a judge would impair her ability to do her job, it is 
submitted that not having a system of sanctions is potentially more of a threat to a 
judge’s career as behaviour that in other jurisdictions might lead to a sanction, 
might, in Ireland lead to removal. The Sheedy episode is instructive here.  
                                                 
49
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50
 n 6. 
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While Justice Hugh O’Flaherty was certainly wrong to interfere in the 
Sheedy case and, whether intentionally or not, was the cause of getting the case re-
listed and ultimately Sheedy being released, we have to question whether this 
behaviour was serious enough to merit removal.
51
 He may very well have decided to 
resign anyway but if a system of sanctions had been in place and if it were open to 
the Chief Justice to administer some sort of reprimand instead, it is possible that 
O’Flaherty’s career could have recovered. We also have to ask if the behaviour of 
O’Flaherty was any more serious than that of Judge Desmond Hogan when he 
allegedly inquired into an ongoing case following a representation from a politician. 
This case melted into the shadows once the presidents of the High and Circuit Courts 
decided nothing untoward had occurred. However, this was the only possible 
outcome under the present system because there is no possibility of admitting that 
wrongdoing had occurred, then taking appropriate action. This was not behaviour 
which would require removal but if the incident occurred as Justice Abbott has 
alleged then it should certainly have attracted a sanction for Judge Hogan who, it 
seems, acted inappropriately.
52
 The ultimate sanction of removal is not suitable for 
every little indiscretion but at the same time, if judges are seen to ‘get away with’ 
misbehaving just because their conduct is not serious enough to merit removal then 
this can cause serious problems of confidence in the system. 
Even if we accept that a system of sanctions is necessary, we then have to 
decide on the type of sanctions which would be appropriate. The Report of the All-
Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution, which is considered below, drew a 
distinction between legal and moral sanctions. According to the Report, legal 
sanctions are penalties imposed by law and moral sanctions are psychological 
pressures imposed by society; these pressures would be imposed by a group 
consisting of the judge’s peers on the bench and respected lay persons.53 The idea of 
legal sanctions is a difficult one because it affects both judicial independence and 
public confidence in judges in a more serious way. It could be argued that imposing 
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a legal sanction on a judge effectively takes away her independence and means that 
members of the public will not have the same respect for the judge because of that. 
Thus, there are a number of questions which follow from any decision to create a 
more comprehensive disciplinary system. The main questions to be asked include: 
Should disciplinary action be made public and what effect would that have? Should 
there be a hierarchy of sanctions or specific sanctions for specific offences? Should 
the sanctions include actions such as demotion and reduction of salary or is this 
unconstitutional? And finally, is there greater protection for judicial independence in 
having moral rather than legal sanctions? 
In order to consider these questions, it is helpful to look at a long-established 
system which uses various legal sanctions as disciplinary action. 
 
(i) Discipline of Judges in the Civil Legal System of France 
 
The discipline of judges in France is the responsibility of the Conseil Superieur de la 
Magistrature (Superior Council of Judges). According to the current Constitution, 
the role of the Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature (the CSM) is to assist the 
President of the Republic in his mission as the ‘guarantor of the independence of the 
judicial authority’ and the President of the Republic is to act as the President of the 
CSM, essentially a figurehead role. The CSM’s duties include nominating and 
appointing judges and public prosecutors and acting as a disciplinary council, 
something ‘which ensures that the judiciary cannot become an instrument of 
political power’. The Council is empowered to punish recalcitrant members. 
Sanctions available to the CSM include: 
 
• Reprimand with a note on the judge’s file 
• Mandatory transfer of jurisdiction 
• Withdrawal of certain functions 
• Reduction in grade by one degree 
• Reduction in grade by more than one degree 
• Mandatory retirement 
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• Dismissal with pension 
• Dismissal without pension54 
 
The least severe form of discipline is a negative evaluation. This is not 
considered a formal sanction but it can at least impair a judge’s chances for 
promotion. The most usual sanction resorted to is an official warning (reprimand) 
which is deleted from the judge’s file after three years if no further warning or 
disciplinary sanction has been given. The Minister for Justice, in consultation with 
the judge’s superiors, may ask for the judge to be suspended with pay during the 
proceedings. The judge has a right to see the charges and his or her record and all 
documents of the preliminary investigation. The judge can have counsel and call 
witnesses before the CSM. In a type of appeal, a judge can seek to have the 
judgment annulled by the Council of State.  
 
(a) Instances of Misconduct
55
 
The behaviour for which sanctions are given is quite varied and ranges from 
inappropriate judicial comment to criminal behaviour. However, the most common 
sanction is a reprimand. In a case from 1966, a judge published an article under a 
pseudonym in le Monde, in which he criticised the Minister for Justice for a recent 
decision. The CSM found that the article demonstrated a deliberate ignorance of the 
principle of the independence of the judiciary and issued a reprimand.
56
 In another 
case in 1969 it was found that a certain judge neglected his duties of care. He was 
absent from court without permission supposedly because of an illness he had 
contracted during a stay in Algeria. When a higher judge pointed out some 
shortcomings to him, he responded with a rude and aggressive letter. In deciding to 
sanction him with a reprimand, the CSM took into account his excellent record and 
previous good conduct.
57
 The CSM also gave the sanction of reprimand with a note 
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on the judge’s file in 2001 when a certain judge was found guilty by the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance of exercising violence on his partner and possessing a dangerous 
weapon.
58
  
Another common sanction is that of reduction in rank, which also involves a 
transfer of jurisdiction. In one example where this sanction was given in 1999, a 
particular judge, being unable to obtain an amphetamine drug, which she had used 
for many years and felt she still needed, falsified documents on headed paper from 
the Hospital Raymond-Poincaré in order to obtain the drugs. She was found guilty in 
the Tribunal Correctionel and fined 5,000 francs, but the decision was excluded from 
publication in the judicial bulletin.
59
 In another case in 2004, a judge had caused a 
number of minor incidents both inside and out of court because of an alcohol 
dependency. These incidents were witnessed by a number of people and because of 
this, it was felt, she had damaged public confidence in the judiciary. The CSM 
decided to withdraw her function as a Juge d’Instruction (which amounts to a 
reduction in rank) and transfer her to a different jurisdiction.
60
  
Generally, it is only the lesser forms of punishment which are resorted to, 
although there have been times where it was necessary to use the nuclear option of 
dismissal. The CSM produced a report of all disciplinary cases from 1958 to 2005 
and only 16 cases led to the removal of the judge involved (this includes cases of 
mandatory retirement). This is quite a small figure, especially when we consider that 
in the year 2000, according to statistics from the Ministry of Justice, there were 
6,721 judges in France.  
Until 2001, the procedure was private but there was a suggestion that the 
absence of publicity contravened Article 6 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights and so an organic law was brought in, in 2001, which provided that all 
sittings of the Council would now be in public. The aim of this was not only to 
effectively reinforce the legitimacy of the disciplinary council but also to guarantee 
the respect of rights and liberties of individuals according to the values of the 
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Convention. In fact, even though judges are allowed to object to the public hearing, 
most prefer to have to have a public debate on this issue.
61
 
While the information above is instructive, it is also necessary to point out 
that judges in France occupy a very different position to those in Ireland. They are 
viewed as civil servants, they embark on a judicial career directly out of university 
and so are often not experienced professionals by the time they reach the bench and 
they are not treated with the same sort of reverence often accorded to judges in 
Ireland. However, that is not to say that, while the system in France is quite 
different, lessons cannot be learned from their procedures. 
 
  
(ii) Sanctions in Ireland? 
 
With regard to the possibility of sanctions being introduced for judicial 
misbehaviour in Ireland, there is an argument against a public reprimand as it could 
undermine the independence and respect of the judge in question and it could make 
it difficult for the judge to continue on the bench. But on the other hand, if the 
misbehaviour has been made public, then a private sanction would be 
counterintuitive. Of course if the misconduct is relatively minor then there would be 
no real reason to make the reprimand public. Since a public reprimand is a much 
more serious punishment than a private one, this would have to be confined to 
serious cases of misbehaviour, where it is necessary for the public to be aware of the 
fact that the judge has been disciplined. Essentially, if the misconduct has been made 
public, then the resulting sanction would have to be made public in order to have any 
effect and the same would apply if the misconduct is so serious that it should be 
made public. 
Related to this is the question of whether the judge could continue to 
administer justice after having been admonished. In France, this does not seem to 
pose a problem, although this may be because their judges are not regarded in the 
same way as English or Irish judges. At present, because it would be so unusual for a 
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judge to be reprimanded in Ireland then it could possibly have a negative effect. On 
the other hand, if this was to happen as part of an established system of discipline, 
then it is possible that the public would have more confidence in the administration 
of justice if they could be assured that a judge who steps out of line will be punished. 
One might then ask how the sanctions would be determined. The obvious 
option would be to have a list of sanctions, in varying degrees of seriousness, which 
would be available at the discretion of the disciplinary body, a system not unlike the 
French one. However, the seriousness of the sanctions is also a delicate area. 
Presumably, the option of dismissal would not be available to any sort of judicial 
disciplinary body as this would, in fact, amount to a usurpation of the legislative 
power of removal. At least that is the constitutional position at present. It would of 
course be entirely possible to hold a referendum for the purpose of amending Article 
35.4.1º to allow for a committee of judges to remove errant judges. Neither would 
reduction of salary be possible because of the fact that Article 35.5 specifically 
prohibits this. It appears that demotion may not be possible under the Constitution 
either. For example. if a Circuit Court judge was moved down to the District Court, 
this would effectively constitute removal from the Circuit Court, since each of the 
courts in the Irish system is separate. To remove a judge from the Circuit Court, the 
constitutional procedure would have to be followed, therefore one could not 
conceivably have demotion as a sanction. 
In a few of the reports, outlined below, moral rather than legal sanctions 
were opted for, presumably because of the fear of interference with judicial 
independence. In a jurisdiction such as Ireland, where incidents of judicial 
misconduct are quite low, it is likely that moral sanctions will be preferred.
62
 
Similarly, there seems to be a consensus that if a system of lesser forms of discipline 
was to be introduced in Ireland, in order to protect judicial independence, the body 
responsible for this would have to be a judicial or primarily judicial one.
63
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V.  A CODE OF CONDUCT 
 
While we have already considered defining more clearly the type of behaviour 
which should lead to discipline or removal of judges, another option, or an 
additional safeguard, would be to draw up a list of conduct judges are to abide by in 
order to maintain good behaviour. It could be argued that a code of conduct makes it 
easier for judges to behave within acceptable standards because unless standards are 
actually laid down, then there is always a possibility of unintentionally stepping over 
the line, whereas when there is a specific, accepted code then it is easy to see what 
behaviour is tolerated and what is not. Two examples are considered below. 
 
 (i) The Code of Judicial Conduct in the United States 
The earliest form of judicial code in the United States was the ‘Canons of Judicial 
Ethics’, which were written in 1924 by a committee of the American Bar 
Association, chaired by William Howard Taft, then Chief Justice of the US Supreme 
Court. These canons were extremely vague and ineffective and so they were 
replaced by the ‘Code of Judicial Conduct’ in 1972. The American Bar Association 
created the code, which was adopted by the Judicial Conference on 5 April 1973. 
This code is only binding when a federal or state government adopts it, but almost 
all of them have. In fact, 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
code (in whole or in part). Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have not adopted 
the code, but each has created its own set of regulations, principally based on the 
code. The Judicial Conference of the US Courts adopted the Code of Judicial 
Conduct in 1973, thus subjecting federal judges to its rules. Various governments 
have used violation of the rules as the basis for taking actions against deviant judges.  
The code now contains seven canons: 
 
1. A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary 
2. A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in 
All Activities 
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3. A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office Impartially and 
Diligently 
4. A Judge May Engage in Extra-Judicial Activities to Improve the Law, the 
Legal System, and the Administration of Justice 
5. A Judge Should Regulate Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of 
Conflict with Judicial Duties 
6. A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received for 
Law-Related and Extra-Judicial Activities 
7. A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity64  
 
There is then an explanation of each Canon. First, each canon is broken down and 
explained. Let us take, as an example, Canon 2 on Impropriety: 
 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary.  
B. A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence 
judicial conduct or judgment. A judge should not lend the prestige of the judicial 
office to advance the private interests of others; nor convey or permit others to 
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. A 
judge should not testify voluntarily as a character witness.  
C. A judge should not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. 
 
Then there is commentary provided on each of the sections. The commentary on 
Canon 2A is laid out as follows: 
Canon 2A. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible 
or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of 
constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore accept restrictions that 
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so 
freely and willingly. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety 
or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and 
personal conduct of a judge… Actual improprieties under this standard 
include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this 
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Code. The test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct 
would create in reasonable minds, with knowledge of all the relevant 
circumstances that a reasonable inquiry would disclose, a perception that 
the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, 
impartiality, and competence is impaired.  
 
The commentary on this particular section is very broad but, in general, the 
commentary moves from extremely broad to very specific situations. The specific 
situations seem to have developed from cases that have arisen over the years. One 
advantage of this system is that the canons themselves are so ambiguous that almost 
any type of behaviour can be made to fit into one or another category. 
 It has been conclusively decided that enforcement of the code is a matter of 
public concern. For instance, in re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, the US 
Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability 
Orders held that anyone can take a complaint of judicial misconduct to their relevant 
judicial council, as locus standi is not necessary here.
65
  
  
(ii) Guide to Judicial Conduct in England and Wales 
The United States chose, as the most suitable type of code for that jurisdiction, 
general principles, which can be interpreted and explained. The Judges Council for 
England and Wales decided on an alternative option. The Guide to Judicial Conduct, 
originating in guidelines drafted in 2002, was reformulated in 2006 and has been 
updated a number of times.
66
 The guide is described as offering ‘assistance to judges 
on issues rather than to prescribe a detailed code and to set up principles from which 
judges can make their own decisions and so maintain their judicial independence’.67 
Initially, the guide is based on the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 
which were initiated in 2001. The 38-page document (the amount of detail is striking 
in comparison to the 19-page American document) sets out comprehensive standards 
for judges in the areas of independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, 
competence and diligence, personal relationships and perceived bias, and includes a 
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detailed chapter on activities outside of the court as well as a short piece aimed at 
retired judges and various appendices. The Bangalore Principles are set out as the 
beginning of the guide. They are as follows: 
 
I. Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental 
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify 
judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects. 
II. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It 
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the 
decision is made. 
III. Integrity is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. 
IV. Propriety, and the appearance of propriety, are essential to the performance 
of all of the activities of the judge. 
V. Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the 
due performance of the judicial office. 
VI. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of 
judicial office. 
 
These principles are intended to work like the canons in America and each principle 
has appended explanatory paragraphs. Although some jurisdictions have officially 
adopted the Bangalore Principles,
68
 others, such as England and Wales, have chosen 
to use the Principles as a model and have created their own guide based on the 
Principles.  
The England and Wales guide is quite comprehensive in its consideration of 
all types of judicial conduct. An example of one of the shorter parts is as follows: 
 
4. INTEGRITY 
4.1 As a general proposition, judges are entitled to exercise the rights 
and freedoms available to all citizens. While appointment to judicial 
office brings with it limitations on the private and public conduct of a 
judge, there is a public interest in judges participating, insofar as their 
office permits, in the life and affairs of the community. … Judges should 
avoid situations which might reasonably lower respect for their judicial 
office or might cast doubt upon their impartiality as judges. They must 
also avoid situations which might expose them to charges of hypocrisy 
by reason of things done in their private life. Behaviour which might be 
regarded as merely unfortunate if engaged in by someone who is not a 
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judge might be seen as unacceptable if engaged in by a person who is a 
judge and who, by reason of that office, has to pass judgment on the 
behaviour of others. 
4.2 A judge’s conduct in court should uphold the status of judicial office, 
the commitment made in the judicial oath and the confidence of litigants 
in particular and the public in general. The judge should seek to be 
courteous, patient, tolerant and punctual and should respect the dignity 
of all. The judge should ensure that no one in court is exposed to any 
display of bias or prejudice on … ‘irrelevant grounds’. In the case of 
those with a disability care should be taken that arrangements made for 
and during a Court hearing do not put them at a disadvantage… 
  
The guide is set out in a manner which gives both judges and the general public a 
good understanding of the conduct expected of judicial office holders. Areas of 
contention are carefully mentioned and judges are advised to steer clear of certain 
situations. However, even a guide as detailed as this cannot cover every possibility 
and sometimes in order to get around the inclusio unius est exclusio alterius 
argument, it is simpler to avoid detail and rely on general principles. Nevertheless, 
the guide is a good start to ensuring accountability and discipline and the benefits of 
having a written document, which judges and others can consult when needed, are 
obvious. 
 
(iii) Relevance in Ireland 
Presumably, these jurisdictions will be considered if it is decided to opt for a code of 
conduct in Ireland. While the American code has obvious merits in its focus on solid 
principles which can be developed and added to later, it is submitted that its use in 
the US as a basis for taking action against judges would not be favoured here. The 
detailed guide in England and Wales is impressive, and while the lack of existing 
material or examples to draw upon in this jurisdiction might lead to a guide based 
more on general principles, it is likely that the approach whereby the guide is framed 
as advice and assistance to judges rather than a strict, prescribed code, would be 
preferred in this jurisdiction. 
 
 
VI. REPORTS AND ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
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Certain recommendations for reform, which have been made by various bodies, have 
been referred to above but it will be useful to provide a brief summary here. 
 
(i) Report of the Constitution Review Group
69
 
This report, published in 1996, was critical of existing structures for judicial 
discipline in Ireland. The group felt that the removal provision is inadequate as it is 
and recommended the provision of a procedure similar to that of Article 12.10, 
which provides for an impeachment process for the removal of the president. It also 
recommended amending Article 35 of the Constitution in order to provide for a 
judicial council, which would regulate judicial conduct. While this report was 
generally accepted, there was no move to implement any of the recommendations in 
this area. 
 
(ii) Fourth Progress Report of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the 
Constitution
70
  
This report endorsed most of the recommendations of the Constitution Review 
Group, although there were some disagreements with the misbehaviour provision.
71
 
The report recommended the establishment of a council to regulate the conduct of 
judges, which would comprise judges, retired judges and also a lay element. 
However, this council would have no power to impose legal sanctions as it was felt 
that such a power would threaten judicial independence. Instead the report stated 
that the body could ‘express its disapproval and/or propose counselling/training, 
make administrative arrangements to avoid a repetition of the problem, issue a 
written apology to the complainant or publish a summary of its findings’.72 It 
stressed that these are moral rather than legal sanctions. It was also felt that this 
council should have a constitutional foundation. 
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(iii) The Sixth Report of the Working Group on a Courts Commission (The 
Denham Report)
73
 
This group was established by the Minister for Justice Nora Owen in 1996. The 
primary recommendation of the Working Group was that ‘an independent and 
permanent body should be established as an agency of the State to manage a unified 
courts system’.74 In its sixth report, simply entitled Conclusion, the group 
recommended the establishment of a Committee on Judicial Conduct and Ethics,
75
 
which would draw up a code of ethics for judicial conduct as well as dealing with 
matters such as complaints, judicial discipline and judicial studies.  
In relation to the establishment of a disciplinary system, the group examined 
systems in other countries and came to the conclusion that Ireland would benefit 
from a system whereby a judicial body would consider complaints made against 
judges. It was submitted that this body would have to be controlled by the judiciary, 
in order to ensure independence, and the body should also be pre-emptive and 
objective. The complaints procedure would be structured but informal and a code of 
ethics would be drawn up. 
So, unlike the Fourth Progress Report, this report (which was published 
first) has no mention of lay involvement, and suggested the body be set up on a non-
statutory basis. However, both reports are in agreement in preferring moral to legal 
sanctions.  
 
(iv) Report of the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Ethics (The Keane 
Report)
76
 
This report came from the group that was established following the 
recommendations of the Denham Report and it contains the most detailed set of 
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recommendations for the establishment of a disciplinary system for the judiciary. 
The committee took submissions, held a conference and conducted studies in this 
area before coming to its conclusions. The jurisdictions of Canada, New South 
Wales, New Zealand, England and Wales, India, Connecticut and California were all 
considered. The main proposal in this report was the establishment of ‘The Judicial 
Council’. The details were as follows: All judges would be members of the new 
council. This council would comprise a board and three committees. The board 
would consist of the chief justice and the presidents of the other courts, four judges 
from each court and one other judge, who could be a member of any court, and this 
position would rotate to a different court every four years. The three committees 
would be as follows: 
 
1. the Judicial Conduct and Ethics Committee; 
2. the Judicial Studies and Publications Committee; 
3. the General Committee. 
 
Each committee would consist of the president of each court, four judges from each 
court and one extra judge for each committee. The Judicial Studies Committee 
would effectively take over the work of the Judicial Studies Institute and the General 
Committee would ‘keep under constant review questions of remuneration and the 
working conditions of judges and present regular reports to the Board’.77  
 
(a) The Judicial Conduct and Ethics Committee 
The most relevant committee here is the Judicial Conduct and Ethics Committee. 
This committee would consider ‘all questions of judicial conduct and ethics arising 
in particular cases’.78 There would be a complaints officer, to whom members of the 
public could make complaints. This official would operate a filtration system so that 
frivolous or vexatious complaints could be recognised and dealt with appropriately. 
Serious complaints would be referred to a panel of inquiry. The panel, which would 
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have a wide discretion as to how to conduct its inquiry, would be comprised of two 
judges and one lay person of standing within the community, to be appointed by the 
attorney general. There would be no members of the legal profession included in this 
system. The panel would have all the ‘powers, rights and privileges vested in a judge 
of the High Court on the occasion of an action’.79 
The panel would present its findings to the committee in a written report with 
a recommendation as to what action should be taken, which could be a private or 
public reprimand or a recommendation that ‘the executive consider the tabling of a 
resolution in both Houses of the Oireachtas calling for the removal of the judge from 
office for stated misbehaviour or incapacity’.80 There would also be the possibility 
of a recommendation for counselling or treatment for the judge in question and a 
request that the judge receive no court duties for a specified time – effectively a 
suspension. The sanctions were expressed to be moral in nature, as opposed to legal. 
The committee would also be responsible for drafting a code of ethics which, 
when approved, would be published and distributed in the form of a handbook to all 
newly appointed judges. The board would be required to meet at least once a month 
and publish an annual report on its activities. It would have to be appointed on a 
statutory basis in order to ensure adequate funding and to ensure it would have the 
necessary legal powers to carry out inquiries. All judges would be subject to the 
council and so the existing provisions providing for the discipline of District Court 
judges would have to be repealed. 
 
(v) Report of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties – Justice Matters: 
Independence, Accountability and the Irish Judiciary 
Following years of inaction, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties decided to produce 
another report on this important issue.
81
 Although without actually recommending 
anything novel, the report covered a very wide range of issues surrounding judicial 
discipline and interviewed present and past members of the judiciary as well as 
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various other legal personages. The main recommendation in the report was the 
establishment of a judicial council as recommended by the Keane Report.  
 
(vi) Developments 
While the various reports are in agreement on many issues such as the establishment 
of a council generally and the preference for moral rather than legal sanctions, there 
are also disagreements about other matters. The Fourth Progress Report (and the 
Constitution Review Group) recommended a constitutional basis for the body; the 
Denham report favoured an informal structure; while the Keane Report was based on 
a statutory proposal. Also, while the Denham report was silent on the issue of lay 
involvement, the Keane Report agreed with the other reports that the inclusion of lay 
persons would benefit the council.
82
 
 Following all of these recommendations in 2001, it was finally decided to 
take some action. The response was to introduce the Twenty-Second Amendment to 
the Constitution Bill. The aim of the Bill was to introduce a body that would be 
empowered to investigate the behaviour of judges and to give it constitutional 
protection. Secondly, the Bill purported to change the removal provision in Article 
35.4.1˚ in order to introduce a procedure akin to that of Article 12.10. It was 
envisaged that this Bill would have been put to the people in 2001 during a 
referendum in which issues involving the Nice Treaty, the International Criminal 
Court and the formal abolition of the death penalty were also up for consideration. 
However, the Opposition objected to various provisions and the Bill was never put 
to the people. 
 Although, as we have seen, very detailed reports had previously considered 
this area and ample proposals had been put forward, the Bill was extremely short, 
meagre, and disappointing in contrast to the reports, and no organic legislation had 
been provided for. The Opposition was accused of ‘specious barrack room 
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lawyering’83 and opposing the Bill simply for the sake of it but the Bill had serious 
shortcomings.  
The new provision purported to establish a judicial council but there was no 
guidance as to how such a council would be set up, maintained, how many members 
it should have, who would be responsible for appointing the members, how long 
membership would last or what responsibilities it would have. The words of Deputy 
Shatter during the debates on this Bill are quite accurate: 
 
A constitutional provision for the establishment of a judicial council 
should have been contained in this Bill but has inexplicably been omitted 
by the Minister. He has now promised the enactment of legislation at a 
later date to establish such a council. If it is genuinely his intention to 
establish such a council, it should be given a constitutional status.
84
  
 
While explaining the Bill, Deputy Brian Lenihan described the new body as ‘a 
judicial council which, among other things, would provide disciplinary measures for 
lesser forms of judicial misconduct’.85 However, there was nothing in the proposed 
provision to indicate that the new body would have any such responsibility. Another 
oversight was that while provision was made for investigating the behaviour of 
judges on the bench, there was no provision for the investigation of conduct which 
occurred before the appointment of a judge. The Opposition also criticised the Bill 
because it blindly followed the Keane Report but that report had been made on the 
basis that no change would be made to the Constitution. Deputy Howlin pointed out 
the ‘absurdity of the Minister’s position’ in that he had ‘adopted the committee's 
proposals which it drew up as the furthest it could go in the current constitutional 
climate, but he is proposing to change the Constitution in order to enable it to do 
something that it can do already’.86  
 The second principal feature of the proposed amendment was the change to 
the removal procedure contained in Article 35.4.1˚. Minister for Justice John 
O’Donoghue explained the proposed procedure as follows: 
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A charge against a judge must be preferred by either House of the 
Oireachtas and the proposal to prefer a charge must be made by a notice 
of motion in writing signed by not fewer than 30 members. When a 
charge has been preferred by either House, the other House must 
investigate the charge or cause it to be investigated by any court, tribunal 
or other body… A charge against a judge must be preferred by either 
House of the Oireachtas and the proposal to prefer a charge must be 
made by a notice of motion in writing signed by not fewer than 30 
members. When a charge has been preferred by either House, the other 
House must investigate the charge or cause it to be investigated by any 
court, tribunal or other body.
87
 
 
It was this provision which caused so much contention. In particular, Fine Gael 
objected to the fact that the two-thirds majority was required not just to remove a 
judge but even just to suspend or investigate. They claimed that the provisions 
constituted an ‘unnecessary barrier to the commencement of any such 
investigation’.88 This argument is actually quite sensible. It is submitted that the 
provision of the two-thirds majority vote to remove a judge was a step in the right 
direction and would provide more protection than currently exists, but there was no 
need to go as far as requiring a two-thirds majority vote for every aspect of the 
procedure, particularly in order to commence an investigation.  
 Other shortcomings included the fact that the Bill did not specify the 
relationship the council would have with the legislature in the event of removing a 
judge. For example, it did not anticipate what would happen should the new body 
feel the conduct of a judge was not so serious as to merit investigation but the 
government or the Oireachtas disagreed or vice versa. What is more, the provision 
did not specify whether members of the body who had conducted an investigation 
into allegations of judicial misconduct would be required to give evidence before the 
Oireachtas or explain their conclusions. Because of the various objections, the Bill 
was abandoned.
89
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 The possibility of reform was raised again briefly in 2002 when Deputy 
Howlin tabled amendments to the Courts and Court Officers Bill 2001, which would 
have brought in a code of conduct for members of the judiciary. The amendments 
were withdrawn, however, due to a lack of support. He had originally sought to table 
another amendment which would establish a judicial ethics tribunal to investigate 
allegations of judicial misconduct, but this was ruled out of order. In rejecting 
Deputy Howlin’s proposed amendments, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform John O’Donoghue expressed the opinion that the Bill did not provide the 
right context for the proposed provisions and this appears to have been the end of the 
matter.
90
  
 During the years following the Curtin case, there were negotiations between 
the government and the judiciary and terms were drawn up for a judicial council. 
The Attorney General’s Office, in consultation with the then Minister for Justice 
Michael McDowell, was then given the task of drawing up a Bill but when this was 
then sent back to the judiciary they rejected it, claiming that it was not what they had 
agreed.
91
 The judges then set about drafting their own document on a judicial 
council. It was later reported that a two-person working group consisting of 
representatives of the Chief Justice John Murray and the Minister for Justice had 
been established in order to finalise the particulars for a Judicial Council Bill.
92
 The 
scheme for a draft Judicial Council Bill was then published in 2010, based on the 
recommendations in the Keane Report, and while it was generally well received, no 
further progress was made before the 2011 election, which brought in a new 
government. The new Minister for Justice
93
 Alan Shatter expressed a commitment to 
publish a new Bill and it has appeared on the government’s programme for 
legislation since then. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Under the current Irish system, there is no mechanism by which members of the 
public or lawyers or court officers can bring a complaint against a judge. This is a 
huge oversight in an era of accountability. Even if an instance of judicial 
misbehaviour comes to light, unless it involves a District Court judge, there is no 
statutory or constitutional authority for an investigation into the behaviour. 
Furthermore, even if it is clear that some sort of misconduct has occurred, the only 
option available is to attempt to remove a judge by joint resolutions in the Houses of 
the Oireachtas and that process is also very unclear. 
The underlying point here is that our current system for disciplining judges 
needs to be reformed. First, the disciplinary body promised by the enigmatic Judicial 
Council Bill needs to be established. At the very least, it needs to be clear what sort 
of behaviour will lead to removal. Due to fears surrounding interference with the 
independence of the judiciary, it seems inevitable that any such clarification to the 
constitutional provision will, by its very nature, be ambiguous. However, any of the 
suggestions mentioned above, such as using public confidence as a yardstick or 
considering whether the conduct makes the incumbent unfit for judicial office, 
would be an improvement on the current situation. While it might be useful to have 
certain examples of what constitutes misconduct in a judicial code of conduct, it is 
submitted that it would not be suitable to enumerate such categories in legislative 
form and perhaps an assistive guide would be of more use. Similarly, the question as 
to the possibility of having lesser sanctions needs to be addressed. It is submitted 
that having a system of sanctions, rather than presenting a threat to the independence 
of judges, would actually benefit judges and would provide a boost for public 
confidence in the system in that members of the public would be assured of 
accountability amongst some of Ireland’s highest office holders. As well as 
clarifying the grounds for removal and providing for a system of sanctions, the 
process of removal itself also needs to be clarified. While a confused attempt was 
made to begin the process of removal for Brian Curtin, the Supreme Court provided 
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guidance in the case that followed and this should provide the basis for any future 
procedure.  
It is to be hoped that it will not take another judicial scandal for this subject 
to be finally addressed. It is crucial that this issue is dealt with sooner rather than 
later, for the good of the system of administration of justice in Ireland and to provide 
clarity for all involved. Moreover, it is to be hoped that, when discussions around the 
Judicial Council Bill eventually begin, careful consideration will be given to the 
issues raised in this piece and to the wealth of research which has already been 
published in the various reports mentioned. 
 
